Introduction
Between 2000 and 2007, Russia enjoyed a widespread economic recovery in production and investment. Revival of the economy reflected several forces: a drastic fall in the ruble-dollar exchange rate, which made domestic import-substituting products competitive with imports, a four-fold increase in the world prices of energy, and a macroeconomic stabilization that produced a fiscal surplus, reduced inflation, and remonitized Russia's barter economy. While surging demand for oil and gas provided a gigantic domestic windfall for Russia's government in the form of export duties, resource taxes, and other taxes on oil producers, it also created incentives for the federal government to re-capture control rights to natural resource stocks. Thus, the past two years have seen a substantial transfer of effective ownership from private firms to government control. The re-nationalization of resource ownership is taking many different forms. It involved the expropriation of Yukos and the sale of Yuganskneftegaz to Rosneft for $9.35 billion, the purchase of Sibneft by Gazprom, the acquisition by Rosneft of energy assets in Eastern Siberia, and the assignment to Rosneft of the exploration license for Sakhalin-3.
Thus, it is clear now that future energy developments in Russia will proceed under very different rules of the game than prevailed in the recent past and past trends will provide relatively little information for forecasting future developments. Nevertheless, it is instructive to look at Sakhalin's role as an expanding supplier or oil and gas in North East Asia, asking several questions. What were the circumstances that allowed a remote Russian island in the North Pacific to attract billions of dollars in foreign direct investment into technologically difficult energy projects? What are the lessons learned from the development of Sakhalin energy resources for the multinational energy companies, for international investors, for the Russian federal and territorial governments, and for the citizens of the Russian Far East (RFE)? How has the income from existing projects been divided between Moscow and the RFE? Has the past decade of energy investment benefited Sakhalin and its residents?
Looking ahead, we may also ask how the re-centralization of Russian economic management is likely to impact future developments on Sakhalin. Will the changed rules of the game impact the availability of advanced technologies or the efficiency with which investment is used? What are the potential impacts of changed ownership on environmental risks to the North Pacific fishery? Can Russian energy development reverse the steady out-migration of population from Sakhalin and the rest of the RFE?
Sakhalin's Energy Sector
The oil and gas industry is Sakhalin's oldest. The first well was drilled in 1911, the first oil field established in 1928. After the oil shock of the early 1970s, the Soviet Union agreed with an international consortium to undertake exploration of offshore sites.
Exploratory work began in 1976 with a Japanese consortium, Sodeco. During the 1976-1982 periods, the project, Sakhalin-1, discovered two fields, Chaivo and Odoptu, but neither field was deemed profitable at the low fuel prices prevailing in the 1980s.
Subsequently, several additional offshore fields were discovered.
In 1991, Russia invited competitive international bidding for a feasibility study of two large deposits in northeastern Sakhalin, Lunsky and Piltun-Astokhsky. After intense competition between six consortia, a group that included Marathon Oil, McDermott, and Mitsui was chosen to undertake exploration, and a holding company, Sakhalin Energy Development Company was established. Later, Royal Dutch Shell became the operating partner of that project, called Sakhalin-2. In 2006, the Natural Resources Ministry cancelled the Sakhalin-2 project's environmental approval and threatened to stop the project, but all issues were resolved when Gazprom acquired a 50% plus one share stake in Sakhalin-2 for $7.45 billion, leaving Shell, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi as junior partners, with Shell retaining operating responsibility.
During the 1990s, the Russian government tendered exploration and development rights to several additional potential sites on the Sakhalin shelf, offering sites separately in order to generate competition between potential investors. A table at the end of the paper, Sakhalin Shelf Projects, identifies seven separate projects, listing the relevant fields and reserves. However, in addition to Sakhalin-2, only one of these projects, Sakhalin-1 moved forward to production. Sakhalin-1, based on three fields located on the northeast shelf of Sakhalin, is led by Exxon Neftegas Ltd. Other participants are two Russian subsidiaries of state-owned Rosneft--Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf and RosneftAstra--the Japanese company, Sakhalin Oil and Gas Development Co., and India's ONGC Videsh Ltd.
Initially, oil and gas reserves in Sakhalin-3, Sakhalin's Kirinsky and Ayashsky fields were licensed to consortiums involving ExxonMobil, Rosneft, and Texaco Block (Sakhalin-5), and British Petroleum states that they are eager to proceed with further development. Thus, Sakhalin's energy resources could serve as a long-term source of oil and gas in Asia. Their phased development would fund construction of infrastructure, investment, and employment for decades. The rents realized from energy sales could provide tax revenues (or in-kind subsidies) to the federal and regional governments.
Incentives and Investment Risk on Sakhalin
What were the circumstances that allowed Western multinationals to commit to energy projects on Sakhalin in the mid-1990s? In retrospect, were these commitments over-optimistic? In a number of respects, Sakhalin differs from other resource-rich regions. Its location on Russia's periphery, but only 60 kilometers from Japan, gives it strategic importance to Moscow. Moreover, the rapid fall of population from 715,000 to 526,000 between 1990 and 2006 signaled the burden of unemployment together with Moscow's inability to provide its previous rate of subsidy. Thus, when development started in 1994, the Russian government was eager to encourage investment. Moreover, Sakhalin's remoteness from Moscow weakened the interest of competing domestic oil and gas interests in blocking foreign involvement in immediate development. Before the recent rise in oil prices, the domestic oil industry faced severe capital constraints. "…the majority of the pipeline construction projects, except for the trunk ones, did not comply with, or meet, world standards…No provision was made in the projects for monitoring pipeline conditions during operations…The inappropriate use of corrosion inhibitors and electrochemical protection units has resulted in high corrosion rates in pipelines…The lack of on-line pipeline diagnostics has meant it has been difficult to detect damage and so prevent leakage of gas, oil and oil products. Western energy executives find the Russian environment uniquely difficult. In industrialized countries, they argue, the oil producer finds strong physical and institutional infrastructure, a strong network of suppliers and services, developed financial markets and an effective legal framework. But there are also many competitors in such markets.
In developing countries, there is little local infrastructure or industrial support, a weak capital market, and an incomplete legal framework. But, in these markets, policy makers are open to modernization and willing to construct physical and institutional infrastructure to foster development. Here, the formation of strong relationships can create a relatively stable business environment for the firm and provide some barriers to competition.
The Russian environment represents a third case in which there is a large and politically powerful domestic oil and gas industry that has incentives to block foreign competition. There is also a large body of administrative regulation and practice that gives numerous regulatory agencies the power to shut-down a project at any time.
The 1995 Production Sharing Legislation, which governs the legal framework for
Sakhalin-1 and -2 is intended to provide a clear, long-term legal framework. It exempts the projects and their contractors from Value Added Tax (VAT) customs duties, property taxes and other levies. It provides 100% cost recovery for PSA investors, after which project revenues are divided between the company, the Russian federal and oblast' governments according to a profit -based formula. The Russian federal and oblast governments receive a royalty in the form of gas equal to 6% of the oil and gas produced for the life of the project. Preference is given to qualified Russian firms, with best effort directed to achieve 70% Russian content over the life of the project. Initially, PSA laws were contradictory and subject to arbitrary change by the Russian side. Long promised passage of improve PSA legislation by the Duma was blocked and significant legal barriers were raised to foreign developments in Russian resources. More importantly, the existing laws were violated regularly by government agencies. Customs Authorities charged value added taxes on equipment and blocked export of oil; the Port Authorities levied a $25,000 port fee on the sailing of every tanker from the Vityaz complex, and multiple other regulatory agencies, each of which had the power to shut down project operations at any time, required lengthy approvals.
In spite of these difficulties, Western firms were attracted to Sakhalin's location because they could have direct access to the Pacific market without facing potential hold up by Transneft, the Russian government oil pipeline monopoly. 
Implementation Issues
In 2007, both Sakhalin-1 and -2 are running full steam ahead. Sakhalin-2 was the first firm to undertake production. Sakhalin-2 consists of two fields-PiltunAstokhskoye, with estimated oil reserves of 150 million tons, and Lunskoye, with estimated gas reserves of 642 billion cubic meters of gas. The first phase of operations entailed the installation of the Molikpaq platform at Astokh and seasonal production and export using a storage tanker. A second, much larger phase of the project entails:
• A second production platform on the Piltun-Astokhskoye field;
• A new platform on the Lunskoye field, capable of producing 17 bcm/year of gas;
• An onshore processing facility to take the gas and crude oil from both fields;
• Two 800 km onshore pipelines delivering oil and gas to the south of the island;
• An oil export facility capable of year-round operation;
• The first LNG plant and associated export facilities built in Russia;
• Island infrastructure upgrades, such as roads, bridges, rail, port, airport, and medical facilities. In 2007, the company had spent $390 million on Sakhalin infrastructure.
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Phase 2 of the project is the biggest single integrated oil and gas project ever undertaken. Maximum production rates from the project are 175,000 barrels per day oil and 9.6 million tons of LNG.
In 2006, Shell had much to celebrate. By the end of 2005, the revenues to the Russian Government from the project exceeded $460 million in bonus payments, royalties and taxes. As part of the figure, $100 million was contributed to the Sakhalin Development Fund. With full production, the Russian government would receive $300 million per year in royalties, which would rise to $2 billion after cost recovery. Russian contractors had received $8.3 billion in contracts and 12,000 workers were employed.
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The company signed three 20-year LNG sales contracts in Japan for a total of 2. In the short-run, Sakhalin-2 is back on track and scheduled to begin delivering LGN in late 2008. The Russian government approved cost increases, environmental issues disappeared, and Gazprom participation seems to reduce the activities of rent-seeking federal agencies in the region. Still, for investors and potential customers, what is important is that Sakhalin-2 is under Gazprom control, and that control will mean a dramatic shift in the administrative environment and in Russia's participation in Pacific energy markets. Gazprom's entrance into the RFE energy market impacts Exxon
Neftegas and Sakhalin-1 as well, for, with a monopoly on the export of natural gas, Gazprom has denied Exxon's contract to deliver pipeline gas to China, instructing the company, instead, to deliver their gas to Sakhalin-2.
Turning to Sakhalin-1, it looks as if Russian state control of energy assets will make that promising project uncertain as well. The project consists of three fields:
Chayvo, Odoptu, and Arkutun-Dagi located on the northeast shelf of Sakhalin Island. Sakhalin-1 will have a sizeable natural gas capacity as well, but at the moment sale of gas is restricted to domestic customers. Natural gas supplies to Khabarovsk Krai reached 134 million cubic feet (3.8 million cubic meters) per day to address increasing demand during the 2006-2007 winter season, but this gas was delivered at prices well below variable costs and, thus, constituted an in-kind tax on the project. The disposition of natural gas remains uncertain. The project signed an agreement with China for delivery of pipeline gas, based on an intended extension of an existing pipeline under construction by Rosneft and territorial government administrations. However, recently, Gazprom purchased the existing pipeline, extending it south to the city of Khabarovsk.
Under new legislation, Gazprom holds a legal monopoly on the export of gas from Russia. In 2007, Gazprom announced that Sakhalin-1 would not receive approval for export of gas to China, but would be required to deliver gas to the Sakhalin-2 LGN plant for export. Technologically, the project is well-placed to undertake further investment.
Exxon introduced a land-based, state-of-the-art Extended Reach Drilling (ERD) technology to minimize the environmental impact of drilling. So far, 11 extended reach wells have been drilled from the Yastreb land rig, extending 11 kilometers from shore and setting records by depth, horizontal reach and drilling speed. Oil and gas is also produced from a 20-well offshore platform, called the Orlan. Thus, although Exxon
Neftegas has constructed a state-of-the-art production facility, the eventual profitability of its operations and its willingness undertake further investment will depend not only on world prices, but also on the rules of the game that Russia imposes for supplying that market.
(Insert Table 1 : Sakhalin Shelf Projects; Table 2 : RFE Production of Oil; Table 3 : RFE Production of Natural Gas)
Regional Welfare
Just at the point in which Western multinationals are re-evaluating the risks of engagement in Russia, the population of Sakhalin and Khabarovsk is seeing strong positive impacts to their current incomes and expectations for the future. The first decade of economic reform in the RFE was difficult. Cuts in federal military spending reduced employment. At first, export of raw materials subsidized unprofitable producers, but, by 1995, population was leaving most regions, notably the northern territories. In the short run, resource stocks of timber and fish were drawn down at staggering rates. By 2000, the fisheries of Primorskii krai and Kamchatka were yielding half of 1990 output (Table   4 .) On Sakhalin, smaller fishing companies left some of the most productive fisheries, such as crab because the prices charged for quotas exceeded the world market price of output.
Although the direct revenues to Sakhalin were modest, the region enjoyed (Table 6 .) Since population was falling over the same period, real GDP per capita was estimated to be 2.5 to 3.4 times higher, depending on whether industrial or consumer prices were used as deflators.
Estimates of real income show similar divergences. Both Russian official series and deflated series show the same drastic drop in real income in 1998, but the official series report a modest increase of 25% in real per capita income in 2004, while the deflated series report a doubling of both income and real expenditure over the same period ( Table 7 .) The high estimates agree with independent calculations of real income by Nadezhda Mikheeva, who finds that real income in the whole RFE region was rising at an average rate of 11.2% per year between 1999-2002. 8 Between 1985 and 2004, the number of people receiving pensions rose 50% and the number of individuals receiving subsidized housing doubled (Table 8 .) However, a recent paper by the author questions the extent to which social benefits are means tested.
In estimates across all regions of Russia for 1997-2003, she finds that the Russian index of budget requirements is driven by arbitrary cost differences across regions and by the mandated support for 32 million "veterans of social labor"-former state employees.
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If life expectancy is a good measure of population well being, then Sakhalin shares the same decline observed across Russia (Table 9 .) Life expectancy of women is 69; for men it is only 55 years. Nevertheless, the recent data show a steady improvement in income on Sakhalin.
Turning to the general situation in the Russian Far East, I find a similar contradiction between the official indices and direct calculation of deflated indices. As is true on Sakhalin, population is leaving the region at a steady pace, notably from Chukotka, Magadan, Kamchatka, and Sakhalin (Table 10 .) The official index of real income estimates that average real income in the region remains lower than in 1994 (Table 11 .) According to the official data, only Sakha and Khabarovsk enjoy higher levels of real income in 2004 than they received in 1994 (Table 12 .) Yet, again, deflating the current price measures of per capita income by the consumer price index indicates that average regional income grew slightly after 1995, crashed in 1998, and now appears to be 75% higher than in 1995 (Table 13 .) The recovery of individual regions is diverse.
Amur, Primore, and Khabarovsk are lagging, while Sakhalin, Magadan, and Sakha show the highest rates of increase (Table 14 .) Gini coefficients of inequality are considerably lower than elsewhere in Russia-Sakha and Magadan are the most unequal, Primore and Amur have the lowest inequality (Table 15 .) Nevertheless, the top 20% of income recipients in all regions receive more than 45% of regional income (Table 16 .)
If a massive commitment of investment into the energy sector on Sakhalin has helped fuel and expansion of construction and employment in the region, how will the shift of control from Western firms to Russian state-owned Gasprom and Rosneft impact regional welfare? One piece of information is a brief glance at what is happening to income in the Yamal-Nenets region, the source of most of Gasprom's existing production. A look at developments in that region is not encouraging. Although Russian natural gas currently accounts for about one-third of export earnings and 8.5% of GDP, Gasprom has invested little in maintaining existing resource capacity or in developing new reserves. In the region, which has a population very similar in size to Sakhalin's, real income dropped precipitously in 1998. Currently, it has recovered to about 25% above the 1997 level (Table 17 .) Gazprom transfers natural gas out of the region at low transfer prices. In the 1990s, the regional administration received tax payments in the form of rights to natural gas, valued at approximately $2 to $4 per billion cubic meters.
However, the allocation came with the obligation to resell the gas to a commercial subsidiary of Gazprom in an opaque transaction that did not appear to benefit the regional budget.
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The tax impact of oil and gas development requires a separate essay.
Briefly, production sharing establishes a separate framework intended to shelter projects from changing tax policies. In the case of Sakhalin-1 and -2, cost recovery clauses were intended to repay up-front investment costs and international debt before partners began participating in major income streams, although the government receives a royalty of 6%
with the start of production. Since 2000, federal tax law directs 95-100% of resource extraction payments and 80% of royalties to the federal level. Similarly, the federal government will receive 80% or more of the net revenues from other project income. So the region expects to see relatively little direct fiscal benefit from energy development.
Regional authorities report that increased municipal taxes on firms and property are largely off-set by direct reductions in local shares of other tax revenues, so local officials view the employment impacts of economic activity as the region's main benefit.
The majority of regional fiscal benefits have derived from a one-time, five-year payment from each project at the start of production equal to $100 million. Sakhalin-2 contributed $20 million per year beginning in 1997 and Sakhalin-1 began making this payment in 2007. There has been between $700 million and $800 million in regional investment into improvements in roads, bridges, ports, and other regional infrastructure from Sakhalin-1 and -2. Some investments are directly related to project infrastructure, but most are non-project commitments to the region. The projects also fund an array of medical, educational, environmental, cultural, and training programs in the region.
Like most other territories in the RFE, Sakhalin's consolidated (territorial and municipal) budget revenues are set approximately equal to total regional tax revenue. In the cases of Sakhalin and Primore, regional budget expenditure just balances regional revenue. In the case of Khabarovsk, regional budget expenditure exceeds regional revenues by 17-20% annually, the excess being funded by federal transfers to the region.
Conclusions
In sum, then, the citizens of Sakhalin can look ahead to a strong positive impact of energy investment into six or more projects for decades. This economic activity should bolster construction, employment, and infrastructure in the region. However, most of the fiscal revenues from energy are likely to be centralized in the national accounts of Gazprom and Rosneft or delivered on subsidized terms to government authorities elsewhere in the region. As in the past, the division of benefits at the center between the state-owned monopolies and the Treasury is likely to be the subject of administrative negotiation. As in the past, there will continue to be numerous interest groups lobbying for domestic access to energy on subsidized terms. With a legal monopoly on the export of natural gas, Gazprom will be in a position to take delivery of energy from international projects on monopoly terms.
Returning to the questions that we raised in this essay, it appears that Western investors have been disappointed in their expectations about the imagined security offered by production sharing laws in Russia. They now must seek to find a way of participating as junior partners in energy projects that will be under Russian government control. The lesson for international capital markets is that the Russian government is willing to sustain a reputational loss and pay a high risk premium in order to capture control of energy assets. Loss of access to foreign direct investment on pre-existing terms is unimportant to a host government that accounts for 11% of world oil exports and 27% of exports of natural gas. However, the Russian state-owned monopolies lack the technical expertise to develop their resources safely in difficult, earthquake prone, Arctic regions. Thus, environmental groups and the fishing industry will be operating in a government-controlled environment that will be considerably more hostile than in the past.
Since the energy sector is highly capital-intensive, energy production and export is unlikely to reverse a long-run decline in RFE population, although high levels of construction will promote employment for a decade or more. Tables   Table 1: Sakhalin Shelf Projects  Table 2 : RFE Production of Oil Table 3 : RFE Production of Natural Gas Table 4 : RFE Seafood Production Table 5 : Sakhalin Population and Employment Table 6 : Sakhalin Real GDP Table 7 : Sakhalin Real Income Table 8 : Sakhalin Social Services Table 9 : Sakhalin Life Expectancy Table 10 : RFE Population Change Table 11 : RFE Official Index of Real Income Table 12 : RFE Official Regional Real Income 
